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We consider a decision maker whose preferences over random variables are locally upper-
or/and lower-semicontinuous in the topology of convergence in measure . On the one
hand, convergence in measure stands for a plausible description of how some decision
makers might perceive similarity of random variables. More precisely, we show that this
topology can be generated by the k-truncated expectation metric
E (jX   Y j ^ k) (1)
where the truncation value k > 0 cuts o¤ any large di¤erences between the random
variables X and Y . This topology therefore describes decision makers who care about
extremely bad and extremely good events but who also tend to ignore extreme di¤erences
in the magnitude of such events. On the other hand, convergence in measure turns
out to be particularly interesting because a decision maker whose preferences are lower-
semicontinuous in measure is bound to violate in specic choice situations the convexity
of strictly better sets. Convexity of strictly better sets, however, is central to standard
characterizations of global risk/uncertainty/ambiguity aversion, cf. Cerreira-Vioglio et al.
(2011, p.1276):
Convexity reects a basic negative attitude of decision makers toward the
presence of uncertainty in their choices, an attitude arguably shared by most
decision makers and modelled through a preference for hedging/randomization.
Continuity in measure is thus not merely a purely technical assumption but it comes
with strong implications for a decision makers choice behavior such as, e.g., an aversion
against portfolio diversication which would only reduce risk on tail events. To assume
that some decision makers have preferences which are continuous in measure might thus
be one possible explanation for empirically observed violations of convex choice behavior.
For example, experimental studies within the prospect theory framework typically elicit
violations of convexity in the form of S-shaped Bernoulli utility (i.e., value) functions
dened over gains and losses and inversely S-shaped non-additive probability measures
(for an overview on this huge literature see Wakker 2010). Similarly, the popularity of
the value-at-risk criterion suggests that some decision makers violate convexity when it
comes to the risk on tail events.1
This paper builds on our previous incompatibility analysis in Assa and Zimper (2018)
which was based on the assumption that preferences are complete over the whole set of all
1Of course, continuity concepts are not directly testable through nitely many observations of choice
behavior. Violations of convexity aloneas, e.g., expressed by the popularity of the value-at-risk criterion
cannot prove that these decision makerspreferences are continuous in measure. We come back to this
point when we discuss the behavioral meaning of continuity.
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random variables dened on an arbitrary non-atomic measure space. As our main nding
we had shown that such preferences cannot be simultaneously (i) globally convex and (ii)
globally continuous in the topology of convergence in measure. Our presentlocalanalysis
extends this previousglobalanalysis along two dimensions. Firstly, we split up continuity
into the two weaker principles of upper- and lower-semicontinuity, respectively, whereby
semicontinuity is only required to hold locally, i.e., around selected random variables. Let
X and Y be two random variables such that the decision maker strictly prefers Y over
X, denoted X  Y . Upper-semicontinuity below Y implies that Xn  Y for any random
variables Xn that the decision maker perceives as su¢ ciently similarto X. On the other
hand, lower-semicontinuity above X implies X  Yn for any Yn su¢ ciently similarto Y .
Continuity, i.e., the combination of upper-and lower-semicontinuity, then stands for the
decision theoretic principle which ensures that Xn  Yn whenever the decision makers
choice set is changed from fX;Y; :::g to the set fXn; Yn; :::g of similar alternatives.
To assume complete preferences over the domain of all random variables is an ex-
tremely strong requirement which is bound to be violated by real-life decision makers
(see, e.g., Danan et al. 2015 and references therein). As a second generalization, we now
require completeness on much smaller domains than the set of all random variables. To
this purpose, we introduce the notion of rich sets of random variables. Formally, we dene
a rich set, denoted R (F), through a construction (i.e., partition) procedure that starts
out with any given subset of at least two random variables, denoted F . The technical
purpose of a rich set is to allow for sequences of random variables which converge in mea-
sure but not in alternative topologies that are compatible with convexity such as, e.g.,
pointwise convergence or convergence in mean. Examples of rich setsthat are constructed
from themselvesare the standard vectors space of random variables such as, e.g., all Lp
spaces with 0  p  1, as well as the vector space of all simple random variables. But
much smaller (and non-convex) sets of random variableswhere F only consists of two
degenerate random variablesmight be rich sets as well (cf. Example 1 below).
Throughout this paper we x the probability space (
;B; ) such that 
 = (0; 1), B
is the Borel-sigma algebra on the Euclidean interval (0; 1), and  is the Lebesgue mea-
sure. Based on our construction of a rich set R (F), we derive the following fundamental
incompatibility results for convexity and semicontinuity in measure .
Incompatibility results for preferences. Suppose that a decision maker has complete
preferences over a rich set of random variables R (F) such that X  Y for some
X; Y 2 F .
(i) Preferences which are upper-semicontinuous in measure  below Y 2 F violate con-
vexity of the strictly worse set at Y .
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(ii) Preferences which are lower-semicontinuous in measure  above X 2 F violate con-
vexity of the strictly better set at X.
Familiar utility specications that come with the convexity of strictly better sets are,
for example, risk averse expected utility decision makers, rank dependent utility decision
makers who are strongly risk averse in the sense of Chew et al. (1985) or Chateauneuf
et al. (2005), as well as Choquet expected utility (Gilboa 1987; Schmeidler 1989) and
multiple priors decision makers (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989) who are (simply speaking)
jointly risk- and ambiguity averse. The above incompatibility results for preferences imply
the following incompatibility results for these standard utility representations.2
Incompatibility results for utility representations. Consider a non-trivial utility
representation
X  Y , U (X)  U (Y )
for preferences over a rich set of random variables. Suppose that the represented
preferences are lower-semicontinuous in measure . Then the following incompati-
bility results apply.






for an arbitrary additive probability measure  on (
;B), then the Bernoulli utility
function u cannot be concave.






for an arbitrary non-additive probability measure  on (
;B), then u cannot be
concave while  is convex.
(iii) Maxmin expected utility. If






for an arbitrary set P of additive probability measures on (
;B), then u cannot be
concave.
2For a general class of utility representations with convex strictly better setsincluding the variational
preferences of Maccheroni et al. (2006)see Cerreira-Vioglio et al. (2011).
4
Next consider a decision maker who strictly prefers random variables that are strictly
less risky in terms of some xed risk measure .
Incompatibility result for risk measures. Consider a non-trivial risk measure rep-
resentation
X  Y ,  (Y )   (X)
for preferences over a rich set of random variables. If  is a convex risk measure,
then these preferences cannot be lower-semicontinuous in measure .
The most popular risk measure is value-at-risk which ranks random variables in ac-
cordance with their loss quantile at a xed condence level. Because value-at-risk is not a
convex risk measure it has been heavily criticized in the axiomatic risk measure literature
which imposes convexity as a desirable axiom (cf., Artzner et al. 1997, 1998; Föllmer and
Schied 2002, 2010; Delbaen 2007, 2009). This literature argues from a normative perspec-
tive according to which any risk measure which is used as a regulatory or/and portfolio
management criterion should always reward the diversication of portfolios. This papers
descriptive perspective on value-at-risk is di¤erent because our analysis o¤ers one possible
explanationin terms of continuity in measurefor the popularity of value-at-risk without
any normative judgment. We show that value-at-risk violates convexity exactly because
it represents preferences which are lower-semicontinuous in measure. Decision makers
with preferences over rich sets that are continuous in measure might therefore feel more
comfortable with a lower-semicontinuous risk measure, as, e.g., value-at-risk, than with
some convex risk-measure that violates lower-semicontinuity.
Behavioral meaning of continuity: Related literature
Our interpretation of the behavioral meaning of continuous preferences follows Fishburn
(1970) who writes:
Continuity formalizes the intuitive notion that if two elements in X are
not very di¤erent then their utilities should be close together. The di¤erence
between x and y can be thought of either in terms of their relative proximity
under  or in terms of a structure for X that is related to  in some way.
(p.35)
The mathematical structurewhich captures the di¤erencebetween random vari-
ables is the topology which has to be chosen by the modeler. The choice of a specic
5
topology is the more empirically relevant the better it manages to capture the similarity
perceptions of a relevant group of real life decision makers. Although the choice of a
topology has thus empirical meaning in the form of similarity perceptions, the problem
from a data-analytical perspective is that such similarity perceptions are not reected
in observable choices. Instead, according empirical studies would have to rely on the
cognizant answers of people asked about their similarity perceptions or/and about their
choices in hypothetical choice situations involving innite converging sequences.
On the one hand, we are not aware of any empirical studies that investigate real life
peoples similarity perceptions for random variables. The pragmatic way around this
lack of empirical evidence is the modelers choice of a topology which he/she deems as
plausible upon introspection. This is exactly our approach in the present paper where
we deem convergence in measure as oneamong many othersplausible topology. Wakker
(1998) writes: We nd continuity an appealing condition when formulated in a space with
a natural metric.When it comes to domains of random variables, alternative natural
metrics become available with our metric (1) being, arguably, one of these natural metrics.
On the other hand, behavioral decision theorists in the tradition of Samuelsons (1938)
revealed preference theory would reject any data in the form of introspective answers as
unreliable and only trust data consisting of observed choice behavior (cf. Agner and
Loewenstein, 2012). Because continuity concepts are not testablethrough choice data,
i.e., they are not falsiable through nitely many observed choices, this extremely pos-
itivist school of thought would reject any topological or/and continuity assumptions as
behaviorally irrelevant. We do not share this view that only choice data is empirically
relevant whereas introspective answers must be discarded as unreliable. Going beyond
revealed preference theory, questions about subjective survival-, health-, unemployment
beliefs within the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) or the Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances (SCF) have proved useful in explaining choice behavior with regards to savings
and retirement decisions.3 We hope that empirical studies about similarity perceptions for
random variables will also become available in the future so that the choice of a topology
could be based on empirical evidence.
Independent of any considerations about empirical relevance, there exists a theoret-
ical literature which investigates behavioral implications of topological assumptions on
preferences for innite spaces used in economic models. Schmeidler (1971) proves that
continuity in any connected topological space combined with transitivity implies complete-
ness of the (weak) preference relation. Based on Schmeidlers (1971) nding, Gerasimou
(2013) shows that continuity in any connected topological space combined with (some)
incompleteness results in a fragile preference relation in the sense that X  Y implies
non-comparability of some X 0 and Y 0 belonging to an arbitrarily small neighborhood
3For references to the economic literature which uses subjective belief data from the HRS or/and the
SCF, see, e.g., Groneck, Ludwig, and Zimper (2016).
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around X and Y , respectively. Gerasimous (2013) argument against the plausibility of
such preference fragility amounts to an argument in favor of continuity as a behavioral
principle:
Indeed, one would expect that when decision makers express strict pref-
erence for one alternative over another, marginal changes in these two alterna-
tives should not result in them becoming incomparable. If they do, then doubt
should perhaps be cast on the validity of the strict-preference comparison be-
tween the original alternatives. Finally, introspection and casual empiricism
do not seem favorable for the propertys descriptive accuracy either.(p.161)
This theoretical approachwhich uses continuity on connected spaces in order to derive
behavioral implications in the form of completeness versus incompleteness of preferences
is reviewed and extended in the (analytically deep) article by Khan and Uyan¬k (2019).
These authors also make the connection between Schmeidler (1971) and Gerasimou (2013)
and earlier contributions in Eilenberg (1941), Sonnenschein (1965), and Sen (1969).
Although our paper shares with this literature the general motivation that continuity
comes with behavioral implications, the details of our analytical approach are rather
di¤erent. Firstly, we are interested in the implications of continuity on the convexity and
not on the completeness of preferences whereby we restrict attention to preferences that
are complete on our relevant subdomain of rich sets. Secondly, instead of distinguishing
between connected versus not connected topological spaces, we endow di¤erent (rich)
sets with the specic metric (1) that generates the topology of convergence in measure.4
Instead of looking into behavioral implications of the abstract property of topological
connectedness, we are interested in the behavioral implications of a concrete topology
which is, in our opinion, one plausible description of how some decision makers might
perceive the similarity of random variables.
The remainder of our analysis proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces relevant mathe-
matical concepts. Section 3 analyzes the incompatibility of convexity and semicontinuity
in measure. Sections 4 and 5 discuss implications for utility representations and risk
measures, respectively. Section 6 concludes with a discussion about the relevance of con-
vergence in measure versus pointwise convergence. Formal proofs are relegated to the
Mathematical Appendix.
4A connected topological space is characterized by the property that only the empty set and the
universal set are simultaneously open and closed (cf. Chapter 1.11.1 in Bourbaki 1989). Whereas some
of the spaces considered in this paper are connected (e.g., the space of all random variables) others are
not (e.g., the smallrich set of our Example 1 below).
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2 Mathematical preliminaries
2.1 Convergence in measure
Fix the non-atomic probability space (
;B; ) such that 
 = (0; 1) and  denotes the
Lebesgue measure on the Borel -algebra B on (0; 1). A random variable dened on
(
;B; ) is a Borel-measurable function Z : 
! R, i.e., for all A 2 B (R),
Z 1 (A) 2 B
where B (R) denotes the Borel -algebra on R. We apply the following identity convention
for random variables
X = Y if X (!) = Y (!) , -a.e.
That is, we treat two random variables as identical objects if their outcomes coincide
except in states belonging to some subset of 
 with Lebesgue measure zero.
Denote by L0 the set of all random variables dened on the probability space (
;B; ).
The results of this paper will be derived for the random variables in some set L  L0
with the informal interpretation that the random variables in L are somehow relevant
to our decision maker.5 A sequence of random variables fZng  L converges to Z 2 L in
measure , denoted Zn ! Z, if and only if, for all  > 0,
lim
n!1
 (f! 2 
 j jZn (!)  Z (!)j > g) = 0.
For a given constant k > 0 introduce the k-truncated expectation metric dk : L0L0 !
[0;1) such that
dk (X; Y ) =
Z




max fjX (!)  Y (!)j ; kg d. (2)
As jX   Y j ^ k is bounded from below by zero and bounded from above by k for all
X; Y 2 L0, this metric is well-dened for all X;Z 2 L0.
Proposition 1. The k-truncated expectation metric dk generates the topology of conver-
gence in measure , i.e., limn!1 dk (Z;Zn) = 0 i¤ Zn ! Z.
5Our preferred interpretation is that the decision maker is awareof the random variables in L. At this
point, we do not even require the decision maker to have complete preferences over all random variables
in L.
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According to the k-truncated expectation metric (2), large payo¤di¤erences are simply
cut-o¤ at some value k. We regard this metric as a plausible description of how some real-
life decision makers perceive the similarity of random variables, especially when possible
payo¤s or losses can become arbitrarily large. In what follows we denote by (L; dk) our
default metric space such that L is endowed with the topology of convergence in measure.
Remark. The topology of convergence in measure can be alternatively generated by
the metric d0 : L0  L0 ! [0;1) such that




jX   Y j
1 + jX   Y jd
(cf. Lemma 13.40 in Aliprantis and Border 2006). Although the dk- and d0-metrics are
topologically equivalent, we prefer the straightforward decision-theoretic interpretation of
the dk-metric according to which the modelled decision makers tend to ignore di¤erences
on extreme tail events.
2.2 Rich sets
Fix a set of references random variables F whereby we assume that X 6= Y for some
X; Y 2 F . Recall from the introduction the formal denition of the sequence fng of
canonical partitions of 






























1 ! 2 
in
0 else.
Denition. Rich sets. We say that R (F) is the rich set generated by F if and only if
it consists, for any pair X; Y 2 F , of all
Yin = Y + n (X   Y ) 1
in
such that 
in 2 n for n  1.
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Example 1. A smallrich set. Let F = fX; Y g such that X (!) = 0
and Y (!) = 1 for all ! 2 
. The constant reference random variables X
and Y generate the rich set R (F) which consists of X, Y and of all Xin, Yin,
n  2, such that
Xin (!) =

0 if ! 2 
n
in i.e., with prob. 1  1n
n if ! 2 




1 if ! 2 
n
in i.e., with prob. 1  1n
1  n if ! 2 
in i.e., with prob. 1n
Note that this rich set is not convex and it only contains random variables
with at most two di¤erent outcomes in their support.
Let n = 1 in the above denition to see that Y11 = X and X11 = Y so that it always
holds that F  R (F). The following fact provides a simple criterion for identifying rich
sets that are generated by themselves.
Observation 1. Suppose that L with F  L is a vector space of random variables such
that Z  1
in 2 L for all Z 2 F and all 
in 2 n with n  1. Then L is a rich set
generated by itself, i.e., L = R (F) = F .
Observation 1 follows because Y + n (X   Y ) 1
in 2 L can be constructed from a
repeated application of the vector operations addition and scalar multiplication whenever
X; Y;X  1
in ; Y  1
in 2 L.
By Observation 1, the standard normed vector spaces Lp, 0  p  1, as well as LS of
random variables are rich sets generated by themselves because Z 2 Lp implies Z  1
in 2
Lp for all 
in 2 n, n  1. The same holds for the vector space of all simple random
variables, i.e., all random variables with nite support. On the other hand, the vector
space of all constant random variables is not a rich set because any rich set must contain
some random variables with at least two di¤erent outcomes in their supports. Also any
set of random variables whose support is on the same bounded subset of the reals cannot
be a rich set.
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2.3 A key mathematical result
A set A  L0 is convex if and only if




The following Lemma states the key mathematical result that we will use to prove our
incompatibility results.
Lemma 1. Consider an arbitrary rich set R (F)  L. If the subset A  (L; dk) is open
and convex, then
A \ F 6= ; implies F  A.
In words: Whenever there exists a random variable Y with Y 2 F and Y 2 A such
that (i) the rich set R (F) is a subset of L and (ii) A is a convex and open subset of
(L; dk), then all random variables in F must also belong to A.
Consider, for example, the relevant special case such that F = R (F) = L is some
vector space of random variables. For such vector spaces Lemma 1 implies that the
universal set L itself is the only non-empty, convex and open subset in the topology of
convergence in measure. Put equivalently, the topological vector space (L; dk) is locally
non-convex. To see this, note that all open balls B" (Y ; dk)  L must be non-convex sets
as L is the only non-empty, convex and open subset of (L; dk).
Remark. It is well-known in functional analysis that the null-functional is the only
continuous linear functional on a locally non-convex vector space (cf. Theorem 1 in Day
1940). Because the expectation operator is a linear functional, it cannot be continuous on
any locally non-convex topological vector space. In particular, we have that the expecta-
tion operator is continuous on (L; dp) for any dp-metric with 1  p but discontinuous for
any dp-metric with p < 1 (cf. Section 1.47 in Rudin 1991) such that these dp-metrics are
dened as follows for p > 0:





jX   Y jp d 0 < p < 1 R


jX   Y jp d
 1
p for 1  p <1
inf f 2 [0;1) j  (jX   Y j > ) = 0 a.e.g for p =1
It is possible to extend our subsequent incompatibility analysis from (L; dk) to (L; dp)
spaces with 0 < p < 1, which are also locally non-convex. However, such extension would
require sequences that are generated by di¤erent partitions of 
 than just the canonical
partitions that we are using for the construction of rich sets.
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3 Incompatibility results for preferences
We consider a preference relation over random variables in L  L0 with the usual in-
terpretations and conventions. X  Y (weak preference) means: either X  Y (strict
preference) or X  Y (indi¤erence). The strict preference relation  is asymmetric, i.e.,
X  Y implies not Y  X. The indi¤erence relation is symmetric, i.e., X  Y implies
Y  X, as well as reexive, i.e., X  X. For the results of this section we do not require
transitivity of . We also do not require completeness of  on L but only on some rich
set R (F)  L.
Introduce the strictly better set at X
S (X) = fZ 2 LjX  Zg .
as well as the strictly worse set at Y
s(Y ) = fZ 2 LjZ  Y g .
Denitions. Semicontinuity of  in measure 
(i)  is lower-semicontinuous in measure  above X if and only if the strictly better set
S (X) is open in (L; dk).
(ii)  is upper-semicontinuous in measure  below Y if and only if the strictly worse
set s (Y ) is open in (L; dk).
Let us give behavioral interpretations of both concepts of semicontinuous preferences
whereby we x X  Y . Upper-semicontinuity in measure  below Y means that Xn  Y
for su¢ ciently large n whenever the Xn converge in measure  to X. A decision maker
with upper-semicontinuous preferences will thus keep preferring Y over the Xn whenever
the Xn are su¢ ciently similar to X whereby we pin down similarity by convergence in
measure. Conversely, a violation of upper-semicontinuity in measure  below Y implies
the existence of some sequence fXng that converges in measure  to X such that
X  Y  Xn
for all n M with M being su¢ ciently large.
Analogously, lower-semicontinuity in measure  above X means that X  Yn for
su¢ ciently large n whenever the Yn converge in measure  to Y . A decision maker with
lower-semicontinuous preferences will keep preferring the Yn over X whenever the Yn are
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su¢ ciently similar in measure  to Y . A violation of lower-semicontinuity in measure 
above X implies the existence of some sequence fYng that converges in measure  to Y
such that
Yn  X  Y
for all n M with M being su¢ ciently large.
Theorem 1. Consider a preference relation  on L which is complete on some rich set
R (F)  L such that X  Y for some X; Y 2 F .
(i) If  is lower-semicontinuous in measure  above X, the strictly better set S (X)
cannot be convex.
(ii) If  is upper-semicontinuous in measure  below Y , the strictly worse set s (Y )
cannot be convex.
4 Incompatibility results for utility representations
4.1 General analysis
Suppose now that there exists an utility representation for given preferences. That is,
there exists some U : L! R such that, for all X; Y 2 L,
X  Y , U (X) < U (Y ) ;
X  Y , U (X) = U (Y ) .
The utility function U is continuous in measure  at Z 2 L if and only if, for every " > 0,
there exists some  > 0 such that
Zn 2 B (Z; dk) implies jU (Z)  U (Zn)j < ".
The corresponding denitions of upper- and lower-semicontinuity of U are given as follows.
Denition: Lower- and upper-semicontinuity of U .
(i) U is lower-semicontinuous in measure  at Y if and only if, for every " > 0, there
exists some  > 0 such that
Yn 2 B (Y ; dk) implies U (Yn) > U (Y )  ". (3)
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(ii) U is upper-semicontinuous in measure  at X if and only if, for every " > 0, there
exists some  > 0 such that
Xn 2 B (X; dk) implies U (Xn) < U (X) + ".
We say that U is lower-semicontinuous (resp. upper-semicontinuous) whenever U is
lower-semicontinuous (resp. upper-semicontinuous) at all Z 2 L. The following propo-
sition (proved in the Appendix) establishes that any utility representation U which is
lower-semicontinuous (resp. upper-semicontinuous) must represent preferences that are
lower-semicontinuous above all Z 2 L (resp. upper-semicontinuous below all Z 2 L).
Observation 2.
(i) Suppose that  violates lower-semicontinuity in measure  above X. Then U violates
lower-semicontinuity in measure  at some Y such that X  Y .6
(ii) Suppose that  violates upper-semicontinuity in measure  below some Y . Then U
violates upper-semicontinuity in measure  at some X such that X  Y .
Next we extend the familiar denitions of concave versus convex functions whose
domains are convex subsets of the real line to utility functions whose domains are convex
sets of random variables.
Denitions: Concavity versus convexity of U . Let L be a convex set.
(i) U is concave on L if and only if, for all X;Y 2 L and all  2 (0; 1),
U (X + (1  )Y )  U (X) + (1  )U (Y ) .
(ii) U is convex on L if and only if, for all X; Y 2 L and all  2 (0; 1),
U (X + (1  )Y )  U (X) + (1  )U (Y ) .
6The converse statement is, in general, not true. A violation of lower-semicontinuity of U at some
Y 2 L implies that the strictly better set S (c) = fZ 2 L j c < U (Z)g cannot be open for some c 2 R
(cf., Theorem 1, p.76 in Berge 1996). However, we do not always have that c = U (X) for some X 2 F .
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Observation 3. Let L be a convex set.
(i) If U is concave on L, then the strictly better set S (Z) is convex for all Z 2 L.
(ii) If U is convex on L, then the strictly worse set s (Z) is convex for all Z 2 L.
Combining Theorem 1 with Observations 2 and 3 gives us the following incompatibility
results for utility representations.
Proposition 2. Consider a preference relation  on a convex set L which is complete
on some rich set R (F)  L such that X  Y for some X; Y 2 F .
(i) Suppose that U is concave on L. Then U cannot be lower-semicontinuous in measure




U (Yin)  U (X) < U (Y ) .
(ii) Suppose that U is convex on L. Then U cannot be upper-semicontinuous in measure




U (Xin)  U (Y ) > U (X) .
4.2 Operators for utility random variables
Fix some increasing Bernoulli utility function u : R! R. Recall that u is concave if and
only if, for all x; y 2 R and all  2 (0; 1),
u (x+ (1  ) y)  u (x) + (1  )u (y) . (4)
For convex u the inequality in (4) is reversed.
Let Z 2 L and note that u (Z) : 
! R such that
u (Z) (!) = u (Z (!))
is itself a random variable dened on (
;B). We refer to u (Z) as utility random variable.
For a given set L of random variables, introduce the following set of utility random
variables
Lu = fu (Z) j Z 2 Lg
and denote by co (Lu) the convex hull of Lu, i.e., the set of all utility random variables
that are convex combinations of the utility random variables in Lu.
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An operator on co (Lu), denoted I, is a mapping I : co (Lu) ! R. The operator I
satises monotonicity on co (Lu) if and only if, for all u (Z) ; u (Z 0) 2 co (Lu),
u (Z (!))  u (Z 0 (!)) for all ! implies I (u (Z))  I (u (Z 0)) .
Denitions: Concavity and convexity of I.
(i) I is concave on co (Lu) if and only if, for all X; Y 2 L and all  2 (0; 1),
I (u (X) + (1  )u (Y ))  I (u (X)) + (1  ) I (u (Y )) .
(ii) I is convex on co (Lu) if and only if, for all X; Y 2 L and all  2 (0; 1),
I (u (X) + (1  )u (Y ))  I (u (X)) + (1  ) I (u (Y )) .
Observation 4. Let L be a convex set and assume that, for all Z 2 L,
U (Z) = I (u (Z)) (5)
for some operator I on co (Lu).
(i) Suppose that u is concave, I satises monotonicity and concavity on co (Lu). Then U
is concave on L.
(ii) Suppose that u is convex, I satises monotonicity and convexity on co (Lu). Then U
is convex on L.
Combining Proposition 2 with Observation 4 gives us the following results.
Proposition 3. Consider a preference relation  on a convex set L which is complete
on some rich set R (F)  L such that X  Y for some X; Y 2 F . Suppose that
these preferences have a utility representation which is of the operator form (5).
(i) If u is concave, I satises monotonicity and concavity on co (Lu), then U cannot be
lower-semicontinuous in measure  at Y .
(ii) If u is convex, I satises monotonicity and convexity on co (Lu), then U cannot be
upper-semicontinuous in measure  at X.
The next subsection applies Proposition 3 to the standard utility representations ex-
pected utility, Choquet expected utility, and multiple priors expected utility, respectively.
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4.3 Standard utility representations
Suppose now that I is an operator dened on an arbitrary vector space V . The operator
I is called superlinear on V if it satises the following two properties:
(i) Positive Homogeneity: for all   0 and all v 2 V ,
I (av) = aI (v) ,
(ii) Superadditivity: for all v; v0 2 V ,
I (v + v0)  I (v) + I (v0) .
The operator I is sublinear on V if superadditivity is replaced with subadditivity (i.e.,
for all v; v0 2 V , I (v + v0)  I (v) + I (v0)).
Standard utility representations for preferences over random variables are of the form
(5) such that I stands for a specic concept of an expectation operator dened on a
suitable vector space of utility random variables V that includes co (Lu). In what follows,
we derive a string of corollaries to Proposition 3 under the assumption that the operator
I in (5) takes on specic functional forms discussed in the literature. All these corollaries
assume complete preferences on an arbitrary rich set R (F) such that X  Y for some
X; Y 2 F ; (in particular, we rule out trivial preferences according to which X  Y for all
X; Y 2 F).
4.3.1 Expected utility
Suppose that I is the standard expectations operator with respect to some additive prob-
ability measure . Because the expectation operator satises monotonicity and is super-
as well as sublinear (i.e. linear), we obtain the following result.
Corollary 1. Suppose that U is of the expected utility form, i.e., for all Z 2 L,





for an arbitrary additive probability measure  dened on (
;B).
(i) If U is lower-semicontinuous in measure , the Bernoulli utility function u cannot
be concave.
(ii) If U is upper-semicontinuous in measure , the Bernoulli utility function u cannot
be convex.
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(iii) If U is continuous in measure , the Bernoulli utility function u cannot be linear.
Let us illustrate Corollary 1 for the simplest example of a rich set we can think of.
Example 2. Consider the rich set R (F) of Example 1 which consists of
X = 0, Y = 1 and of all Xin, Yin, n  2, such that
Xin (!) =

0 if ! 2 
n
in i.e., with prob. 1  1n
n if ! 2 




1 if ! 2 
n
in i.e., with prob. 1  1n
1  n if ! 2 
in i.e., with prob. 1n
If the Bernoulli utility function u was concave, U cannot be lower-semicontinuous















u (Y ) d.




































Y d = 1.

An immediate consequence of Corollary 1 is that there cannot exist a risk-neutral ex-
pected utility decision maker whose preferences are continuous in measure  on some rich
set of random variables (cf. Example 2 where u (x) = x is equivalent to risk-neutrality).
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Next recall that a sequence of random variables fZng converges to Z in distribution7,
denoted Zn ! Z , if and only ifZ
R




for all bounded and -almost everywhere continuous functions u : R! R (cf. Theorem
25.8. in Billingsley 1996). Because convergence in measure of the expected utility rep-
resentation implies convergence in distribution for this utility representation, a Bernoulli
utility function that is bounded from above and from below (-almost everywhere) guar-
antees that expected utility preferences are continuous in measure. In other words, a
bounded Bernoulli utility function, which takes on an inverse S-shape over the real line,
is thus always a su¢ cient condition for continuity in measure  of the expected utility
representation of complete preferences on a rich set.
Discussion: Bounded Bernoulli utility. A bounded Bernoulli utility function guar-
antees continuity in measure  of expected utility preferences on any rich set. However,
such bounded Bernoulli utility of an expected utility decision maker is subject to the same
criticism that Azevedo and Gottlieb (2012) formulate for inverse S-shaped value functions
of prospect theory in their article Risk-neutral rms can extract unbounded prots from
consumers with prospect theory preferences. The following example illustrates the basic
idea of these authorscriticism for our formal framework.
Example 3. Consider a decision maker who has expected utility prefer-
ences with respect to  over the (rich) domain of all random variables with
either one or two outcomes in their support such that the increasing Bernoulli
utility function satises
u (x) =  u ( x) for all x 2 R and lim
x!1
u (x) = c > 0.
Because the Bernoulli utility function is bounded from below by  c and from
above by c, this expected utility representation must be continuous in measure
. Dene, at rst, the random variable
Xn (!) =

0 if ! 2 
n
in i.e., with prob. 1  1n
 1
2
n2 if ! 2 
in i.e., with prob. 1n
7The distribution Z of random variable Z is the probability measure on (R;B (R)) such that
Z (A) =  (f! 2 
 j Z (!) 2 Ag) for all A 2 B (R) .
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Next, dene for any given Xn, a corresponding random variable Y n such that
Y n (!) =

"n if ! 2 
n
in i.e., with prob. 1  1n
 n2 if ! 2 
in i.e., with prob. 1n






























In analogy to Azevedo and Gottlieb (2012), the economic interpretation of
these random variables is as follows: The decision maker is indi¤erent between
(i) the random variable Y n that results in the small positive payout "n with
large probability 1   1
n
and the large loss  n2 with small probability 1
n
and





and nothing else. If a risk-neutral rm o¤ers to trade Y n to
the decision maker in exchange for Xn, the decision makerwho is indi¤erent
between Xn and Y n by constructionhas no problem to accept this trade. The
rm gains from this trade the random payo¤ Zn = Xn   Y n, i.e.,
Zn (!) =

 "n if ! 2 
n
in i.e., with prob. 1  1n
1
2
n2 if ! 2 
in i.e., with prob. 1n















































That is, the rms expected prot from trading Y n for Xn goes to innity
if n gets large. But this would result in an existence problem for a trade
equilibrium whenever the rm could endogenously choose an arbitrarily large
number n (as assumed by Azevedo and Gottlieb (2012)).
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The structure of the above examplewhich pitches ever smaller utility di¤erences of
an inverse S-shaped Bernoulli utility function against linearly increasing expected value
di¤erencesis at the heart of the formal argument in Azevedo and Gottlieb (2012) who
look at joint limit conditions of probability weights and inverse S-shaped value functions
from prospect theory. These authors use the fact that a risk-neutral rm might construct
hypothetical gambles in order to extract large expected prots (at diminishing  "n risk
to itself) to argue against the suitability of prospect theory in economic applications:
Despite the relative success in explaining empirical regularities, prospect
theory is rarely applied to strategic and market environments. This paper
presents problems that one necessarily faces when attempting to incorporate
prospect theory in those environments.
We show that, under conditions satised by virtually all functional forms
used in the literature, individuals with prospect theory preferences accept
gambles with arbitrarily large negative expected values. This result severely
limits the applicability of prospect theory when the supply side of the market
is endogenous.Azevedo and Gottlieb (2012, p.1292)
As our example shows, the criticism of Azevedo and Gottlieb (2012) is not restricted
to prospect theory with inverse S-shaped value functions but equally applies to expected
utility preferences with inverse S-shaped Bernoulli utility functions when the domain
includes random variables with arbitrarily large negative outcomes. As these authors
admit, inverse S-shaped Bernoulli utility or/and value functions explain well empirically
observed choice data. Additionally, bounded Bernoulli utility functionswhich imply an
inverse S-shapehave the two conceptual advantages that they ensure (i) continuity in
measure on a rich domain as well as (ii) existence of an expected utility representation
over large sets of random variables such as, e.g., the set of all random variables.8 Giving
up bounded Bernoulli utility functions might thus come with more severe disadvantages
for relevant economic applications than the problem described in Azevedo and Gottlieb
(2012). After all, this problem only applies to hypothetical market situations in which (i)
8Point (i) is explained in detail in the present paper. For point (ii) see our analysis in Assa and Zimper
(2018) and references therein. For example, Savages (1954) subjective expected utility axiomatization
requires a bounded (Bernoulli) utility function as he considers complete preferences over the set of all
random variables. Compare Wakker (1993) who writes:
Ever since, the extension of Savages theorem to unbounded utility has been an open
question, and with that the question "what is wrong with Savages axioms?". [:::] I think
that "what is wrong with Savages axioms", is primarily his requirement of completeness of
the preference relation on the set of all (alternatives=) acts [:::].(p.448)
21
one trading partner is risk-neutral and (ii) both trading partners are endogenously able
to construct arbitrary gambles which they can trade with each other.
4.3.2 Choquet expected utility and maxmin expected utility
Turn now to the concept of Choquet expected utility for which I in (5) becomes the
Choquet expectation operator with respect to some non-additive probability measure 
(Schmeidler 1989). The Choquet expectation operator satises monotonicity. Moreover,
it is superlinear for any convex , i.e., for any  such that, for all A;B 2 B,
 (A [B) +  (A \B)   (A) +  (B) (6)
(cf. Corollary and Proposition 3 in Schmeidler 1986). In contrast, it is sublinear for any
concave  (i.e., for any  such that inequality (6) is reversed).
Corollary 2. Suppose that U is of the Choquet expected utility form, i.e., for all Z 2 L,








 (u (Z)  x) dx 
Z 0
 1
(1   (u (Z)  x)) dx
for an arbitrary non-additive probability measure  dened on (
;B).
(i) If U is lower-semicontinuous in measure , we cannot simultaneously have that u is
concave while  is convex.
(ii) If U is upper-semicontinuous in measure , we cannot simultaneously have that u is
convex while  is concave.
Choquet expected utility (CEU) theory uses convex non-additive probability measures
to describe ambiguity averse decision makers. To express a behavioral relevant combina-
tion of ambiguity aversion with (standard) risk aversion, the typical modeling choice for
an CEU decision maker combines a convex non-additive probability measure with a con-
cave Bernoulli utility function. By Corollary 2(i) such CEU decision maker cannot have
non-trivial preferences on a rich set of random variables that are lower-semicontinuous in
measure .
Finally, turn to the concept of multiple priors expected utility where the expectation
operator I is dened with respect to a set of additive probability measures (i.e., multiple
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priors). Recall that I satises monotonicity and superlinearity if I is the minimal ex-
pectation operator whereas I satises monotonicity and sublinearity if I is the maximal
expectation operator (cf. Lemma 3.3. in Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989).
Corollary 3.
(i) Suppose that U is of the maxmin expected utility form, i.e., for all Z 2 L,






for some set P of additive probability measures on (
;B). If U is lower-semicontinuous
in measure , the Bernoulli utility function u cannot be concave.
(ii) Suppose that U is of the maxmax expected utility form, i.e., for all Z 2 L,






for some set P of additive probability measures on (
;B). If U is upper-semicontinuous
in measure , the Bernoulli utility function u cannot be convex.
Multiple priors models express ambiguity aversion through maxmin expected utility.9
By Corollary 3(i), the typical modeling choice, which combines maxmin expected utility
with a concave Bernoulli utility function, cannot describe a decision maker have non-trivial
preferences on a rich set of random variables that are lower-semicontinuous in measure .
5 Incompatibility results for risk measures
5.1 General analysis
This section considers a decision maker who ranks random variables in accordance with
some risk measure  : L! R such that
X  Y ,  (Y ) <  (X) , (7)
X  Y ,  (Y ) =  (X) .
9To see the formal relationship between the CEU- and the mutliple priors representation of ambiguity
aversion, observe that for a convex Z Choquet








where P is dened as the core of .
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The interpretation is that the decision maker prefers less risky to more risky random
variables perceives whereby she perceives the riskiness of random variables in accordance
with . Whenever (7) holds for some risk measure , we speak of a decision maker with
-preferences.
The most fundamental property that any risk measure should satisfy is monotonicity,
i.e., for all Z;Z 0 2 L,
Z (!)  Z 0 (!) for all ! implies  (Z)   (Z 0) .
The axiomatic literature on risk measures additionally imposes convexity as another fun-
damental property to ensure that the diversication of a portfolio can never increase
risk.10
Denition: Convexity of risk measures. Let L be a convex set. The risk measure 
is convex on L if and only if, for all X;Y 2 L and all  2 (0; 1),
 (X + (1  )Y )   (X) + (1  )  (Y ) .
Obviously, any -preferences (7) could be equivalently represented by the utility func-
tion U : L! R such that, for all Z 2 L,
U (Z) =   (Z) . (8)
Because of (8) our incompatibility analysis for utility representations carries immediately
over to convex risk measures.11
Proposition 4. Assume that L is a convex set that contains an arbitrary rich set R (F)
such that X  Y for some X; Y 2 F . If  is convex on L, -preferences cannot
be lower-semicontinuous in measure  at Y . More precisely, there must exist some
sequence fYing ! Y on F such that
lim
n!1
 (Yin)   (X) >  (Y ) . (9)
The most prominent risk measure used by nancial practitioners is the value-at-risk
criterion which happens to violate convexity. In what follows, we show that the value-
at-risk criterion must violate convexity on rich sets because it represents preferences that
are lower-semicontinuous in measure.
10Coherent risk measures, dened on some vector space L  L0, have to satisfy positive homogeneity
and subadditivity which implies convexity.
11Note that lower-semicontinuity of U becomes, by (8), upper-semicontinuity of .
24
5.2 Value-at-risk
The value-at-risk of random variable Z 2 L0 at condence level  corresponds to some
-quantile of Z (cf. Chapter 4.4 in Föllmer and Schied 2016) whereby the -quantiles of
Z are the members of the interval






q Z () = inf fx 2 R j    (Z  x)g ,
q+Z () = inf fx 2 R j  <  (Z  x)g .




VaR  (Z) =  q Z () and VaR+ (Z) =  q+Z () .
For any Z with a continuous and strictly increasing distribution function both value-at-
risk denitions coincide. In general, we have that
VaR  (Z) = VaR
+
 (Z) (10)
holds for any given Z for almost all condence levels  2 (0; 1) because there are at most
countably many discontinuity points in the distribution function at which the quantile
interval might not reduce to a single value (cf. Lemma A.19. in Föllmer and Schied 2016).
Whenever the equality (10) holds for a random variable Z, both value-at-risk denitions
VaR  and VaR
+
 are continuous in measure  at Z.
12 If (10) is violated at some Z,
however, VaR  will result for some converging sequences in an upward jumpto a higher
value-at-risk whereas VaR+ will result for some sequences in a downward jump to a
lower value-at-risk at Z. The following example illustrates these possible discontinuities
for both value-at-risk denitions for the non-generic case in which (10) is violated.
Example 4. Consider the random variable
Z (!) =

 1 if ! 2 (0; ] i.e., with prob. 
0 if ! 2 (; 1) i.e., with prob. 1  
and the following two sequences fZ+n g, fZ n g such that
Z+n (!) =






i.e., with prob. + 1
n


















i.e., with prob.   1
n











12In Assa and Zimper (2018) we had incorrectly claimed that value-at-risk preferences are continuous
in measure without the qualifying condition (10).
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Both sequences fZ+n g and fZ n g converge in measure to Z. Note that
VaR  (Z) = 1 and VaR
+
 (Z) = 0

































> VaR+ (Z) .

In the non-generic case that (10) is violated for a given Z, VaR  is an upper-semicontinuous
function in measure  at Z whereas VaR+ is a lower-semicontinuous function in measure
 at Z. Because an upper-(lower)semicontinuous risk measure function corresponds, by
(8), to a lower-(upper)semicontinuous utility representation, VaR  -preferences are lower-
semicontinuous at every Z whereas VaR+ -preferences are lower-semicontinuous at Z if
and only if the generic case (10) holds for Z.
Proposition 4. Consider a rich set R (F) such that X  Y for some X;Y 2 F .
(i) If the decision maker has complete VaR  preferences over R (F), then the strictly
better set at X cannot be convex.
(ii) If the decision maker has complete VaR+ preferences over R (F) such that the generic
case
VaR  (Y ) = VaR
+
 (Y )
holds, then the strictly better set at X cannot be convex.
We illustrate Proposition 4 through a simple example.13
13We write VaR (Z) whenever (10) holds for Z.
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Example 5. Let X =  1 and Y = 0, i.e., X gives a constant loss of
one while Y gives a constant loss of zero. The rich set R (F) generated by
F = fX;Y g consists of X, Y and of all Xin and Yin, n  2, such that
Xin (!) =

 1 if ! 2 
n
in i.e., with prob. 1  1n
n  1 if ! 2 




0 if ! 2 
n
in i.e., with prob. 1  1n
 n if ! 2 
in i.e., with prob. 1n
Fix some  2 (0; 1) and observe that




0 if n > 1

n if n  1

In accordance with Observation 4, these VaR-preferences must satisfy lower-
semicontinuity in measure  above X. To see this, note that, for all fYing !
Y ,




Consequently, the strictly better set at X cannot be convex. To verify this
directly, observe that convexity of the strictly better set at X would result, by
VaR (X) > VaR (Yin)
,
X  Yin











By Proposition 4, value-at-risk cannot be a convex risk measure on any rich set be-
cause it represents preferences that are lower-semicontinuous in measure . In Example 5
this lower-semicontinuity of VaR-preferences is expressed through the decision makers
indi¤erence between all Yin for su¢ ciently large n since we have for all Yin





What happens here is that the decision maker withVaR-preferences ignores the di¤erence
between the tail of the Yin, for which the bad loss of n happens with probability strictly
smaller than , and the tail of Y , for which no loss happens at all. On the one hand, this
decision maker still perceives some di¤erence between the Yin and the Y because their
distance in the dk-metric, i.e.,




is never zero. On the other hand, these random variables have become so similar in
the dk-metric for su¢ ciently large n that the decision maker who perceives similarity in
accordance with convergence in measure stops caring about these di¤erences in the sense
that she becomes indi¤erent between these random variables.
According to Dekel (1989), a transitive preference relation on L exhibits diversica-
tionif










Let us revisit Example 5 to illustrate how value-at-risk preferences may result in the choice
of non-diversied portfolios.
Example 6. Portfolio choice. Consider a portfolio manager with VaR-



















On the other hand, we have for all n > 1

that
VaR (Yin) = 0 for all i,
implying










These VaR-preferences do not exhibit diversicationto the e¤ect that the






Why does the portfolio manager of Example 6 violate diversication of her portfolio?






starts to care about the prospect of some non-zero loss because the probability of such
loss has been lifted over the likelihood threshold (i.e., the condence level ) for which
losses matter to her. Below this condence level, however, the portfolio manager perceives
the Yin as su¢ ciently similar to a zero-loss portfolio so that her indi¤erence between such
tail-risk portfolios and the zero-loss portfolio is perfectly in accordance with preferences
that are lower-semicontinuous in measure.
5.3 Average value-at-risk
We conclude this section with a simple example that illustrates the incompatibility result
of Theorem 4. To this purpose, we consider the convex risk-measure average value-at-risk
which is dened as the average of the random variables value-at-risk over the condence
levels in (0; ).14
Denition. Average value-at-risk. Fix some  2 (0; 1]. The average value-at-risk of







In contrast to value-at-risk, a decision maker with AVaR-preferences also takes all
tail losses into account. Because average value-at-risk is a convex risk measure, AVaR-
preferences must violate lower-semicontinuity in measure on rich sets.
14Our formal denition of the average value-at-risk also appears in the literature as the denition of
the conditional value-at-riskor of the expected shortfall. We follow here Föllmer and Schied (2016,
p.233) who argue that the notion of the average over the interval (0; ) is more precise as it claries that
the conditional distribution in question is the uniform distribution.
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Example 7. Average value-at-risk. Fix any  2 (0; 1] and consider a
decision maker with AVaR-preferences over the rich set from Example 5. The
average value-at-risk of the two constant random variables is trivially given as
AVaR (X) = 1 and AVaR (Y ) = 0.






















AVaR (Yin)  AVaR (X) > AVaR (Y )
in accordance with (9). Consequently, AVaR-preferences violate lower-semicontinuity
in measure  above X on this rich set because we have for su¢ ciently large n
that
Yn  X  Y .

6 Concluding discussion
We have dened rich sets of random variables with the property that complete pref-
erences on such rich sets cannot be simultaneously convex and continuous in measure.
More specically, we have shown that upper-semicontinuity in measure is incompatible
with convexity of strictly worse sets whereas lower-semicontinuity is incompatible with
convexity of strictly better sets.
Convexity of strictly better sets, however, is central to standard characterizations of
global risk aversion or global uncertainty (i.e., ambiguity) aversion and it is also central
to the denition of convex or/and coherent risk measures. Decision theoretic models
that impose convexity (e.g., global ambiguity aversion) as a behavioral axiomand which
must therefore violate lower-semicontinuity in measurework instead with the following
continuity axiom (cf., Maccheroni et al. 2006; Cerreira-Vioglio et al. 2011):
Standard Continuity Axiom. For all Z;Z 0; X; Y , the sets
f 2 [0; 1] j Z + (1  )Z 0  Y g and f 2 [0; 1] j X  Z + (1  )Z 0g (12)
are open subsets of the Euclidean unit interval.
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Translated into our topological framework for subsets of random variables, this stan-
dard continuity axiom captures preferences that are continuous in the topology of point-
wise convergence. More precisely, let X  Y and note that, by (12), the only converging
sequences fYng that are needed for establishing the lower-semicontinuity of preferences
above X are sequences that converge pointwise, i.e.,15
fYng ! Y if and only if lim
n!1
Yn (!)! Y (!) for every ! 2 
. (13)
We regard it as perfectly plausible that many, or even the majority of, decision makers
perceives similarity of random variables in accordance with pointwise convergence (13).
For such decision makers the standard continuity axiom (12) is the appropriate continuity
concept so that these decision makers might, e.g., express global uncertainty aversion.
Unfortunately, we are not aware of any empirical studies about real life peoples simi-
larity perceptions of random variables. Based on anecdotal evidence, however, we would
like to argue that there exists a non-negligible subset of decision makers whose simi-
larity perceptions of random variables are better captured by convergence in measure
than by pointwise convergence. This anecdotal evidence concerns the popularity of the
value-at-risk criterion for the evaluation of portfolios which expresses preferences that
are non-convex but lower-semicontinuous in measure. Recall that the Basel value-at-risk
regulation for bank capital requires banks to absorb losses with a 99:9 per cent proba-
bility which corresponds to a condence level of  = :001. Decision makers with VaR-
preferences would be indi¤erent between a random variable giving always a zero loss and
a random variable that gives a zero loss with probability 1000
1001
and a substantial loss with
probability 1
1001
. That is, these decision makers do not really care about tail-risks that
only happen with a chance of 1
1001
or less. Such ignorance towards the magnitude of
catastrophic tail events is exactly what continuity in measurein contrast to continuity
with respect to pointwise convergencecan capture.
15To see this, note that all converging sequences fYng ! Y which determine whether the strictly better
set at X is open are, by (12), of the form
Yn =  (n)Y + (1   (n))Z 0
such that limn!1  (n) = 1.
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Appendix: Formal proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The if-part. We show that limn!1 dk (X;Xn) = 0 implies
Xn ! X. For an arbitrary  with 0 <  < k dene the event
An = f! 2 











  1An + 0  1Acnd
=  (An) ,
limn!1 dk (X;Xn) = 0 implies limn!1  (An) = 0.
The only-if part. We show that Xn ! X implies limn!1 dk (X;Xn) = 0. For an















k  1An +   1Acn

d
= k (An) +  [1   (An)] .
For every  > 0 we have that Xn ! X implies limn!1  (An) = 0. Consequently,
limn!1 dk (X;Xn)   for all  > 0 which proves the only-if part.
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider a rich set R (F)  L such that Y 2 F as well as
Y 2 A for some open and convex A  (L; dk). To prove the Lemma, we have to show
that F  A.
Step 1. Fix some k > 0. Next, x Y 2 F and consider an arbitrary X 2 F . Since
R (F) is rich, we have
Yin = Y + n (X   Y ) 1
in 2 R (F)
for n  1. Next note that





















Consequently, we have for all Yin, in 2 f1; :::; ng, that
Yin 2 B" (Y ; dk) for " 
k
n
where B" (Y ; dk) denotes an open ball around Y in (L; dk) with radius ":
Step 2. Fix any open set A  (L; dk) such that Y 2 A. By denition, there must
exist some su¢ ciently small " > 0 such that
B" (Y ; dk)  A
so that, by Step 1, Yin 2 A for all in 2 f1; :::; ng with n  k" .















(X   Y )1
in
= Y +X   Y = X,
which gives the desired result X 2 A for any X 2 F .
Proof of Theorem 1. Ad (i). Assume that S (X) is convex. Because of X  Y , we
have Y 2 S (X). If S (X) was open, Lemma 1 implies that X 2 S (X), a contradiction.
Consequently,  cannot be lower-semicontinuous in measure above X. 
Ad (ii). Assume now that s (Y ) is convex. Because of X  Y , we have X 2 s (Y ).
An open s (Y ) would, by Lemma 1, imply the contradiction Y 2 s (Y ). Consequently,
 cannot be upper-semicontinuous in measure below Y . 
Proof of Observation 2. If  is not lower-semicontinuous above X, the strictly
better set S (X) is not open. That is, there must exist some Y 2 S (X) which is not an
interior point of S (X), i.e., for all  > 0, there are Z such that
Z 2 B (Y ; dk) but Z =2 S (X) . (14)
Let n = 1n and pick Yn 2 Bn (Y ; dk) such that Yn =2 S
 (X). By (14), such Yn exist
for all n  1. This constructs a converging sequence fYng, dk (Yn; Y ) ! 0, such that
Yn =2 S (X) for all n, implying
U (Yn)  U (X) for all n whereas U (X) < U (Y ) .
Let
" = U (Y )  U (X) > 0
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to see that, for all n,
U (Yn)  U (Y )  ".
But this violates (3) so that U is not lower-semicontinuous at Y . The argument for
upper-semicontinuity proceeds analogously.
Proof of Observation 3(i). If S (X) is empty, the result obtains trivially. Suppose
therefore that Y; Z 2 S (X) so that U (X) < U (Y ) as well as U (X) < U (Z). If U is
concave on a convex L, we have for any  2 (0; 1)
U (Y + (1  )Z)  U (Y ) + (1  )U (Z)
> U (X) ,
implying
Y + (1  )Z 2 S (X) .

Proof of Observation 4. If u is concave we have, for all !,
u (X (!) + (1  )Y (!))  u (X (!)) + (1  )u (Y (!)) .
Next observe that
U (X + (1  )Y ) = I (u (X + (1  )Y ))
 I (u (X) + (1  )u (Y )) , by monotonicity
 I (u (X)) + (1  ) I (u (Y )) , by concavity
= U (X) + (1  )U (Y ) ,
which proves part (i). Part (ii) is proved analogously.
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